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Abstract This article seeks to understand the evolution of corporate social responsibility (CSR) through
two phases of privatisation: the acquisition of a Cameroonian state-owned public rubber company by
a Singaporean ﬁrm, and the subsequent acquisition of the latter by a Chinese state-owned company.
The investigation revealed that a number of unresolved problems, including uncompensated land, dis-
possession by the government, failure to fulﬁl a promise of vesting a proportion of the company’s capital
with employees and a history of unsatisfactory employment conditions, were passed on to two generations
of multinational owners. Although there are preliminary indications that the Chinese investors may have a
stronger interest in reforming and rejuvenating the company, from increasing production and efﬁciency to
applying CSR standards, it remains to be seen whether the sector will bring greater beneﬁts to local com-
munities and employees given the entrenched nature of pre-existing shortcomings.
Cet article cherche à comprendre l’évolution de la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise lors de deux phases de
privatisation, lorsqu’une entreprise publique de caoutchouc a été rachetée par une entreprise singapourienne,
qui a elle-même été rachetée par une entreprise d’Etat chinoise. La recherche a révélé que deux générations
de propriétaires internationaux ont hérité d’un certain nombre de problèmes non-résolus, tels que la prise de
possession des terres par le gouvernement sans compensation, le manquement à la promesse de remettre une
part du capital de la compagnie aux employés, ainsi qu’un passé de conditions d’emploi non-satisfaisantes.
Certains indices préliminaires montrent que les investisseurs Chinois pourraient avoir un intérêt plus fort
dans la réforme et la revitalisation de la compagnie, que ce soit pour l’accroissement de la production et de
l’efﬁcience, ou pour appliquer les standards de responsabilité sociale d’entreprise. Cependant, il reste à
prouver que le secteur bénéﬁciera plus largement les communautés locales et les employés, au vu des
problèmes pré-existants bien ancrés.
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Introduction
During the last decade, media and academic coverage of China’s investments in African
agriculture have increased manyfold (Schiere et al, 2001; Kaplinsky, 2008; Ademola et al,
2009; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Moyo, 2012). Politically, these investments seem to be major
elements in the gradual replacement of the ‘Washington Consensus’, which for African countries
is synonymous with structural adjustments and the conditionality of economic aid, by the
‘Beijing Consensus’, which is based on the stated principle of non-interference in the countries’
internal politics while promoting a mutually beneﬁcial environment for development and trade
(Meidan, 2008; Delcourt, 2011; Braeckman, 2012). Strategically, these investments can be
ranked as part of the global tendency to accelerate foreign direct investment (FDI) in arable lands
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in order to increase the production of food and other raw materials of agricultural origin such as
rubber (Meidan, 2008; Cotula et al, 2009; Gu, 2009; Gabas, 2011; Amanor, 2012). Trade
between China and Africa, thus, may offer new opportunities for some African countries to
emerge out of the underdevelopment and endemic poverty that has characterised their situation to
date. Considering the poor performance of farming in Africa (see, for example, Allen and Quaim,
2012), an increase in Chinese FDI could contribute to reviving agricultural production through
technology transfer, the use of improved seed varieties, opportunities to access international
markets, job creation, greater tax income and expertise (Castel and Kamara, 2009).
In Sub-Saharan Africa, FDI followed a seesawing trend in recent decades: FDI was higher
during the immediate post-colonial period than in the 1980s, and then rose to a record high of
37.3 billion US dollars in 2008 before levelling off (Meyer, 2012). China’s ‘going global’
strategy, launched in 1999 in part to spur Chinese FDI, has buoyed investment in Africa
following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (Brautigam, 2009; Miller, 2010). Yet despite the beneﬁts of
increased funding, there are still many issues and questions about the negative externalities of
increased FDI in Africa. Foreign investments, particularly in land-based productive sectors such
as agriculture and forestry, can, for instance, engender negative environmental effects, jeopardise
local people’s access to resources essential for survival and may also trigger conﬂicts with
communities adjacent to or within agro-industrial zones.
Such fears in part explain a tendency towards negative evaluations of Sino-African relations,
at least as depicted in certain media and other spheres of Western inﬂuence (Brondeau, 2010;
Delcourt, 2011). One common perspective is that China as a ‘partner in development’ follows a
modus operandi unlike that of traditional partners. Examples that support this perspective include
the manner in which Chinese FDI often favours a public–private approach in its foreign policy,
which can allow Chinese ﬁrms to take risks other private companies cannot afford (Edinger,
2008), and the limited transparency of its high-level negotiations on aid, trade and investments,
which are often linked (Huse and Muyaka, 2008). China’s application of its non-interference
policy when granting ﬁnancial aid is favourably received by many African leaders, who want to
maximise self-determination and minimise non-tariff trade barriers, but this requires turning a
blind eye to a potential consequent decline in socio-environmental standards (BIC, 2006).
Analyses of the Chinese share of investments in long-term development processes in Africa
indicate that there are major differences between sectors, which generally make it impossible to
draw clear conclusions on the impact of these investments on the well-being of communities and
their environment (Asche and Schüller, 2008; Cerutti et al, 2011).
The purpose of this article is to further knowledge of the contributions and impacts of Chinese
investments in Sub-Saharan Africa by evaluating their socio-economic effects on the Camer-
oonian agricultural sector, with a focus on rubber (Hevea guianensis) production. Agriculture is
used here as just an example of the much larger framework under which Chinese investment is
impacting the Cameroonian economy and its environment, of which several dams, roads and
plantations constitute some of the most evident signs. The bilateral cooperation between the two
countries, following the pattern deﬁned by the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation in 2006 (AFRODAD, 2011), covers trade, construction, infrastructure, agriculture,
education, culture, ﬁnance, energy and exploitation of natural resources.
A rubber production and processing company is analysed in a case study that compares three
stages in the life of the company: from a Cameroonian public enterprise (1975–1997), to a
privatised enterprise with non-Chinese capital (1997–2008) and ﬁnally to an enterprise injected
with Chinese capital (2009 to present). This process, in which a third company takes over the
parent company of a subsidiary located in Cameroon, is in many regards similar to the operation
in which a multinational company in the raw agricultural materials sector absorbs the upstream
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and downstream subsidiaries (Gabas, 2011). The case study and historical analysis of this ﬁrm,
through three changes in ownership over the last 30 years, will shed light on how ownership or
geographic origin of investment can affect corporate performance and local socio-economic
outcomes (see also Putzel et al, 2011). The article is organised as follows. The ﬁrst section
presents the theoretical background, the second describes the methods used, and the third shows
and discusses the results chronologically. The last section concludes.
Conceptual Framework
This case study uses the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in which adopting
companies are supposed to go beyond compliance, and undertake actions to provide for social and
environmental well-being, over and above the primary interests of the company and its legal
obligations (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Logsdon andWood, 2002; Utting and Ives, 2006). With
this in mind, the United Nations Global Compact (UN, 2000) suggested three conceptual spheres
for describing CSR: respect for human rights, labour rights and the environment. The paragraphs on
CSR identify two reasons for actions that fall within the scope of CSR. First, the enterprise adopts a
philanthropic approach to fulﬁlling a number of social and environmental goals. The immediate
effects of this approach are a certain reduction in company proﬁts (Baron, 2001). Second, the
enterprise incorporates the CSR programmes in its management and marketing strategies to align
the improved social and environmental outcomes with its own economic interests. Thus, the
motivation is ‘business-oriented’, and the enterprise is ‘privately responsible’ (Baron, 2001). The
theoretical ﬁeld of business ethics leads to the important question of the conduct of multinationals
working abroad, when the socio-environmental standards of the host country are lower than those
of the country supplying the capital. This issue is linked to the one discussed above, that is, to the
headquarters-subsidiary approach (or the centre-periphery approach) to investments, wherein the
integration of multinationals depends mainly on the two processes of control and headquarters–
subsidiary coordination (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Roth and Nigh, 1992).
CSR has been criticised as an instrument of transnational private governance, which
legitimises privatisation of the national patrimony, and entrusts for-proﬁt corporations with the
generation and protection of public goods and prevention of social injustice (see, for example,
Nölke and Graz, 2007). The enhanced role of multinational corporations in governance may be
functional within a paradigm of ‘world-capitalism’ as articulated by Shamir (2011). However,
violations of local rights may also be perpetrated with impunity by global corporations wearing a
thin veil of CSR (Thabane, 2014). From the environmental perspective, CSR has been used to
‘greenwash’ corporate behaviour, when positive perceptions of environmentally responsible
practices are greater than their actual beneﬁts due to a ‘disclosure-performance gap’ (Ullman,
1985; Font et al, 2012). Regardless of these caveats, the principles of CSR can be used as a measure
of corporate performance (without entering the broader paradigmatic mineﬁelds within which it is
embedded) to examine social and environmental performance of ﬁrms on their own merits.
One of the main drivers of CSR is the idea that social and environmental responsibility can
generate economic beneﬁts. Another aspect is the approach to social questions represented by the
stakeholder concept, which requires a consideration of business within a broader ecology of
socio-economic realities incorporating concepts such as human and labour rights, economic and
environmental justice, and a suite of other norms emerging through global discourse. Typical
perspectives on CSR have held out the promise that corporate self-regulation and voluntary
initiatives could be harnessed to address many public social and environmental problems.
In short, where the State fails, private enterprise and non-state actors could succeed (Dahlsrud,
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2008; Utting and Marques, 2013). Stakeholders, in this context, are considered to be persons or
groups affected by the activities of an enterprise (Baron, 2001). Hence, enterprises are expected to
broach socio-ecological issues by evaluating the impact of their activities. According to Utting
and Ives (2006, p. 11), CSR conveys two mains ideas: (i) corporations should go beyond the
minimal standards laid down in law and piecemeal superﬁcial interventions, by adopting a
comprehensive range of voluntary initiatives aimed at minimising malpractice and improving
their social, environmental and human rights performance; and (ii) companies need to be more
responsive to the concerns of stakeholders and to aspects of management that include, but are not
limited to, risk and reputation management. Another comprehensive classiﬁcation of CSR that
will be considered in this article is derived from the work of Auld et al (2008), comprising
individual ﬁrm efforts, individual ﬁrm and individual NGO agreements, public–private partner-
ships, information-based approaches, environmental management systems, industrial association
corporate codes of conduct, and non-state market-driven governance.
As Wong and Kiswend-Sida Yameogo (2011) stressed, CSR is not yet included in public
debate in Africa, and discussion of the subject is limited to certain professional and academic
circles. Thus, subsidiaries of transnational companies operating in Africa do not seem to have
independent CSR strategies or policies. Yet, Tan-Mullins and Mohan (2012) have shown that
Chinese investments in Africa reveal multifaceted CSR outcomes.
Methods Used
The evaluation of the socio-economic effects of Chinese investments in African agriculture, into
which we categorise rubber production, falls under the overall heading of studies on the potential
impacts of trade on forests and local communities identiﬁed as a priority research area (Putzel et al,
2011). With this in mind, the ﬁrst step was to review the documentation available on Chinese
investments in Cameroon, and then to analyse cases that could be useful for this case study. The
choice was based on the following criteria: availability and accessibility of information, especially
unpublished documents; and the accessibility of former executive staff and employees who could
give a historical rendition of events. Five one-to-one interviews were held with experts working in
the agro-industrial sector, and with local government ofﬁcials, to obtain information on the history of
investments: the Council Mayor, the Subdivision Ofﬁcer, the local representative of the Ministry of
Agriculture, the local representative of the Ministry of Forest and one local police ofﬁcer. Two
weeks were spent at the agro-industrial site in July 2012. The purpose of the ﬁeld visit was to
improve our understanding of the socio-economic effects within the enterprise and on the local
riparian communities. Interviews were also held with four company executives, notably the Human
Resources Chief, the farm manager in charge of research and development, the ofﬁcer in charge of
Environment and Security and the factory supervisor. We also conducted two other relevant
interviews with the former Deputy General Manager and the former farm manager. These interviews
provided solid information about the chronological evolution of events. Focus group discussions
were organised with a dozen lower-ranking employees participating in the debates. To collect the
opinions and perceptions of the villagers from the neighbouring communities, focus group
discussions were also held in seven villages. In addition to these discussions, there were meetings
with two leaders of the local NGOs that provide supervision for the rural activities in the zone. Direct
observation was used to empirically verify statements made by local sources.
The historical analysis was facilitated by the fact that the socio-economic and ecological
conditions of the communities bordering the agro-industrial site had been analysed before the
Chinese group took over (Oyono, 2005; Gerber, 2007, 2008). Earlier analyses pointed to conﬂicts
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over land tenure and environmental issues, and a claim for ﬁnancial compensation that pitted the
riparian ethnic communities (Bulu and Bagyeli) against the rubber production group and the State
of Cameroon (Gerber, 2007, 2008). For Gerber (2008, p. 25), the conﬂicts reﬂected opposition
between local communities and agricultural capitalism supported by the State of Cameroon,
which is now highly proﬁtable to foreign multinationals. The value systems of the two sides are
based on different uses and perceptions of forestlands. These pioneering studies served as
historical benchmarks in understanding the evolution of socio-economic conditions and the
dynamics of actions within the communities bordering the agro-industrial complex, from the time
the enterprise was created until the time it was bought by the Chinese investment group, through
to the time when the then-owner, the State, sold it to a privately owned Singapore multinational.
Oyono (2005) and then Gerber (2007, 2008) limited their work to documenting interactions
between the company and the neighbouring local communities, while our enquiries sought to go
beyond this ﬁrst analysis by describing some of the present-day living conditions of the
employees of this company, which is now controlled by Chinese capital.
Results
State Rubber Enterprise: 1975–1997
The public rubber enterprise (Hevecam) is located not far from Kribi, a town located on the
Atlantic coast. It was born out of the State’s capitalistic policy, which set the pace of
Cameroonian economic life on the eve of independence in 1960 (Courade, 1984). Between the
end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1980s, the political authorities in Yaoundé, through
5-year development plans, designed and deﬁned the country’s development policy, focusing
mainly on the establishment of proﬁt-yielding agro-industrial complexes. Such policy is to be
credited with the creation, in 1975, of the public rubber enterprise, with funding from the World
Bank and technical assistance from the French Rivaud Group.
In 1974, to establish the rubber production complex, the State of Cameroon declassiﬁed
a national estate of 41 339 ha of forestlands and reclassiﬁed it as a public estate to be used as a
State investment, and used in kind as part of the start-up capital for the rubber enterprise. This
State acquisition of forestlands was not against the national land tenure laws in force; however, it
was carried out in a fashion that was detrimental to the historically well-documented customary
land entitlements of resident groups belonging to two ethnic minorities (Dugast, 1949; Alexandre
and Binet, 1958; Oyono et al, 2000; Oyono, 2002; Oyono, 2005). These groups include the Bulu
(a Bantu group) and the Bagyeli (a group belonging to the ethnicities once referred to as ‘Pygmy’
populations, or ‘Forest People’). Compensation was not paid that was commensurate with the real
value of the inherited lands these communities were forced to abandon.
The government did award compensation in the form of foodstuffs and a monetary sum of
about €7600 to one village, but the other communities involved were not compensated at all. This
process of dispossession has been considered tantamount to a spoliation of ancestral lands by
State authorities, and has over time generated conﬂicts and a number of legitimate claims for
ﬁnancial compensation (Oyono, 2005; Gerber, 2007, 2008). The legal arrangements and the
deforestation of the occupied lands in preparation for rubber monocropping started in 1975. By
1980, the State had invested over €40 million in the Niétè agro-industrial site (Willame, 1985,
p. 47) and by 1985 the installation of the plantation had created 2800 jobs (Hevecam, 1994). The
workforce grew to 4317 employees by June 1994, and this supported about 15 000 residents of
the 15 villages created by the rubber company for its workers and their families (Hevecam, 1994).
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In the mid-1980s, however, Cameroon was hit by a severe economic crisis that was reﬂected,
inter alia, in the sharp drop in the price of agricultural commodities (including rubber) and in the
stagnation and subsequent downturn in oil production (Courade and Alary, 1994; Gauthier,
1996). After considerable procrastination, the Cameroonian authorities were obliged to accept a
series of Structural Adjustment Programmes, imposed by the Bretton Wood institutions (Gerber,
2008), which led to the privatisation of the State’s agro-industrial heritage (Willame, 1985;
Konings, 1986; Courade and Alary, 1994; Mbembe, 1999; Etounga-Manguelle, 2004). In 1996/
1997, the agro-industrial complex was sold to Singapore’s Golden Millennium Group (GMG).
Privatisation brought the State €39 million for the sale of 90 per cent of its shares (Begne, 2006,
pp. 112–113). The remaining 10 per cent was kept in the State’s portfolio. At the time of
privatisation, the enterprise had a 99-year lease for the 41 339 ha of land area, including 18 000 ha
of rubber plantation, an industrial plant for processing rubber and latex with an initial capacity of
24 tons per day, and over 5000 employees. The latter, together with their families, the
government services and the traders, totalled close to 18 000 inhabitants living in a small agro-
industrial town with a nursery, primary and secondary schools, a 140-bed hospital, a community
centre, sports and recreational areas, and a swimming pool (see Table 1).
Privatisation of the Agro-Industrial Rubber Production Complex: 1997–2008
In 1998, 2 years after the State transferred Hevecam to GMG International, the two parties signed
an agreement with commitments on both sides (Republic of Cameroon, 1998). GMG committed
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to new investments, new jobs, salary increases, and a social security and public services plan, and
the government committed to preferential legal, ﬁnancial and ﬁscal treatment granted to the buyer.
The agreement speciﬁes that the enterprise would make a far-reaching 10-year investment
starting in the reference year 1997/1998, involving the following investments (Republic of
Cameroon, 1998): creation of new Hevea plantations at a pace of at least 2000 ha per year;
regeneration of existing plantations to cover a total area of 14 842 ha; improvement of rubber
processing plants and acquisition of new ones to transform rubber into latex and store it;
construction of a research and development laboratory; creation of 7000 new jobs; increase in
employees’ wages; and the transfer of 3 per cent of the company’s capital to the employees.
Furthermore, in regard to social welfare and public services, the buyer pledged to fulﬁl a number of
conditions, including: assistance and support for the development of village plantations; expansion
of the village plantations in all the riparian communities inhabited by the Bulu and Bagyeli ethnic
groups with ﬁnancial support from the World Bank; improvement of employee housing; provision
of health-care coverage for all employees and their families; protection of the environment; an
increased enrolment capacity for education facilities, maintenance of existing roads; and ﬁnancial
support for police serving the headquarters’ urban area and for other administrative services.
The government of Cameroon agreed in turn to guarantee the unrestricted importation and
transport of materials needed for the operation of the plantation; to take all measures favouring
rubber production and exports; to provide legal guarantees for the non-discrimination of the
enterprise; to ensure respect for private property and for the free exercise of trade and industry; to
authorise the opening of bank accounts abroad; to grant the enterprise the beneﬁts of the tax regime
for strategic enterprises as set out in the Investment Code; to grant an exemption from the insurance
contracts registration tax; to grant a 50 per cent reduction on the corporate tax, a 50 per cent reduction
of the proportional tax on revenue from investment capital and a 50 per cent reduction of an amount
equal to 0.5 per cent of the Free on Board value of the manufactured exports; and to exonerate rubber
exports from the export tax. Lastly, the Agreement included a mechanism for monitoring and annual
control, and for the settlement of disputes arising from the execution of the Agreement. The
Agreement was to remain in force for 12 years starting on 1 January 1998 (see Table 1).
Acquisition of the Agro-Industrial Complex by Chinese State-Owned Enterprise
Since privatisation in 1996, the Cameroonian subsidiary of GMG had structured its industrial
strategy around three main axes (Gerber, 2008): increasing the productivity of the plantations,
maximising proﬁts and, in compliance with the Agreement signed with the State, increasing the
land area under cultivation. As a result, annual latex production rose from 8200 tons in 1988 to
26 500 tons in 2001, and the surface cultivated since privatisation grew from 15 125 ha of rubber
planted (430 ha of which in village plantations) (Gerber, 2008) to 18 000 ha (600 ha of which in
village plantations). Moreover, more equipment has been installed in the processing facility since
privatisation, and in 2010 annual processing capacity ofﬁcially stood at 50 000 tons of latex
(GMG, 2010), though it is likely that actual average production was about 100 tons per day
(Hévéa News, 2012a), or a total of 30 000 tons.
In 2008, Sinochem, a Chinese State-owned enterprise, became the majority shareholder of
GMG International. The management and strategy of the Cameroonian subsidiary changed
de jure with a shareholding ratio of 90 per cent to Sinochem and 10 per cent to the State of
Cameroon. Attention was initially given to increasing the land area planted and, from 2011, to
renovating the old plantations in conformity to the original Agreement, which Sinochem decided
to extend. Furthermore, a new research laboratory was built, and new nurseries are currently
providing new stock to replace old plants. In 2009, the company articulated a policy for
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sanitation, security and environment policy based on eight internal pillars. Efforts are also being
made to expand new sites located at some tens of kilometres from the original headquarters, and
to adopt the ISO 9001 certiﬁcation procedure (Hévéa News, 2012a). Recent data show that
Hevecam produces 60 per cent of Cameroon’s total latex production. It is the third largest
employer in Cameroon with over 5500 employees, and in 2010 generated 49 per cent of GMG’s
global registered proﬁts, more than the company’s other subsidiaries in Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand (GMG, 2010). In 2011, the company was capitalised at €20 million and its
turnover was evaluated at over €90 million (Hévéa News, 2012b). Hevecam’s workforce,
together with their families, merchants and a few civil servants, totals more than 20 000 people
living on the headquarters’ site (Hévéa News, 2012b), divided into 17 camps and 3 villages. The
population level ﬂuctuates during the various seasons of the year, at times reaching up to 35 000
inhabitants (Hévéa News, 2012a).
Discussion
Social well-being is a complex notion but there is general agreement that it includes some measure
of economic prosperity, health and happiness. In this context, the social well-being of employees
and local communities has been assessed using indicators relevant to socio-economic life, including
equity, health and social cohesion (OECD, 2005; Boarini et al, 2006; Boarini et al, 2008).
The socio-economic situation in the study area has recently been characterised by social unrest
over several issues, partly a legacy of the 1998 Agreement and partly due to new claims made by
the employees over their living and working conditions. In a protest over employment conditions,
for instance, the staff went on strike at the end of 2011. At the end of January 2012, the
Cameroonian Minister of Labour chaired a mediation session that brought the strike to an end
(Cameroon Tribune, 2012; Hévéa News, 2012a).
GMG (Singaporean) seems to have respected only a few of the provisions of the Agreement
concluded with the State in 1998. In fact, many claims are still unfulﬁlled with regard to, among
others, higher wages, expansion through creation of new plantations and a new workforce, the
recruitment of the prescribed number of people, the transfer of 3 per cent of the privatisation capital
to the employees and the improvement of the workers’ living quarters through the construction of
houses made of durable materials. The employees felt that the strike was the only way to put
pressure on Sinochem, the new majority shareholder, to change the direction of the reportedly
‘antisocial’ management strategy that had been applied by the former majority shareholder. For
instance, an unskilled farm worker reported that after 12 years of service, his monthly salary in 2012
was just above € 77 per month, that is, barely more than what he had earned in 2000.
The strategy adopted by the staff seems to have worked, and eventually the mediation led by
the Minister ended with the signing of a memorandum of agreement, between the new management
and the staff delegates, which contains plans to settle employee grievances. In particular, the
management promised to grant an exceptional bonus of € 2 million to the employees (about € 313
per employee). Interviews also show that, although health care has reportedly been improving over
the years, regardless of owner, it was under Chinese management that the company decided to
subscribe to complementary health insurance policies for employees and their families. Moreover,
additional equipment and medicines have been bought for the headquarters’ hospital.
Social cohesion, on the other hand, seems still problematic, which could be expected after
several decades of unfulﬁlled (and apparently legitimate) expectations. Overall, the legacy of old
grievances and conﬂicts still complicate social relations in the area, and recent incidents illustrate
the urgent need for improved, more transparent and functioning social policies governing
Assembe-Mvondo et al
472 © 2016 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811
European Journal of Development Research Vol. 28, 3, 465–478
relations between village planters and the company, as well as those with the State. While from
the company’s perspective proﬁt maximisation could be understandable, existing evidence
suggests that this is occurring at the expense of the well-being of employees and local
communities, in part due to a non-transparent way of conducting business.
Recently, for instance, the company has been reportedly buying rubber from 300 riparian village
planters at €0.45/kg. To their dismay, the planters realised that the company was heavily under-
pricing their products, and in early 2012 they met with a competitor in latex production. The latter
started buying the output at €1.4/kg. The company reacted by increasing the price paid to €1.1/kg and
asking the government authorities and the local police to prevent trucks from the competitor’s com-
pany from entering the site, thus preventing the rival company from buying from the local villages.
Although this government action does not comply with the law or the spirit of price liberalisation
and free competition in Cameroon, it was still in force when interviews were conducted, and
contributed to increasing the anger and resentment of local communities towards the company.
Most importantly, such actions raise concerns about the role of the State, which has already been
called into question due to its past decisions on land tenure. Indeed, GMG International inherited a
land conﬂict that, until 1996, had pitted the local Bulu and Bagyeli communities against the State of
Cameroon (Oyono, 2005; Gerber, 2007, 2008). This conﬂict over land tenure was exacerbated by
failure to address the legitimate demands for ﬁnancial and material compensation that should have
been paid to local communities when the Cameroonian government annexed their ancestral lands.
Privatisation did next to nothing to solve the conﬂict. The majority of people we met in the
neighbouring villages are still trying to recover parts of the ancestral lands that were annexed
without ﬁnancial and material compensation. As mentioned, one village did receive compensation,
but this occurred because the rubber plantation established in the village was planted to the
detriment of the existing cocoa crops, whose value for compensation could be established.
There remain also several unaddressed claims for more equity in social policies. For instance,
during privatisation, about 600 ha of rubber plantation was supposed to be returned to several
riparian villages. Contrary to expectations, however, the Cameroonian government and the agro-
industrial company together decided to allocate this land through a call for tender, an expensive
administrative procedure that automatically excluded the village communities from the retro-
cession process and only beneﬁted a politico-administrative elite and the company’s operators,
who took over all the available plots. This fostered a sense of marginalisation and exclusion in the
local population, who is also complaining that, on top of ‘stealing’ their land the company had
done nothing to encourage the recruitment of ‘their children’. Reportedly, only two junior cadres
out of a total of 71 and none of the plantation workers, out of the thousands working for the
company, were recruited from neighbouring villages.
Such latent tensions, together with expectations that remain unfulﬁlled but are considered as fully
legitimate by village elders and youth alike (Oyono, 2010, p. 15), if not addressed, may result in
open conﬂict and violence that disrupt social life. For instance, Oyono (2010, p. 2) reports that young
people from the neighbouring communities, who are vulnerable to unemployment, prostitution and
alcohol-induced delinquency, often steal rubber from the plantations, damage company property and
ﬁght with the workers. Reportedly, police interventions, instead of easing the situation, include
arbitrary detentions and other abuses committed towards neighbouring populations.
On the positive side, some steps in what seems the right direction to, at least partly, solve these
problems have indeed been taken by the new management under Sinochem. Aware of the
environmental injustice that led to violence and frustration among the victims of dispossession,
and pressed by the headquarters’ town ofﬁcials and the leaders of the riparian villages,
management has started negotiating with the local communities about earmarking 7000 ha
(out of the 14 000 that the State had recently declassiﬁed) for rubber production, for a total
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ﬁnancial investment estimated by the company at about €8 million. Two thousand hectares of the
future plantation would be managed as a common property resource shared by the local
communities, and 5000 ha would be managed directly by the company, who in turn would
reportedly pay annual land tenure fees and provide a number of social services to local villages.
Conclusion
The snapshot presented in this article of the socio-economic situation within the rubber
production industry in Cameroon over recent decades shows that employment conditions and,
more generally, relations between local communities and the company have often been
conﬂicted. The causes and intensity of conﬂicts and their degree of violent manifestations have
varied over time, but overall they were, and still are, based on a sense of perceived injustice,
inequity and unfair treatment on the part of the villagers, the workers and their extended families.
Such feelings, and the suboptimal remuneration and employment conditions, can be traced ﬁrst to
the heritage bequeathed by the former owner, the State of Cameroon, to the Singaporean group at
the time of privatisation. Indeed, although the plant reportedly had a production and ﬁrst-level
processing capability and a strong, equipped workforce before privatisation, the cut-rate wage
policy and the working and living conditions were far from ideal under State management.
The trend only became more pronounced and the situation grew worse under the Singaporean
management, with the State playing a passive role in that it did not monitor the working conditions,
contrary to what is mandated by the law over all companies operating on Cameroonian soil. In 2009,
after Sinochem bought a majority share of the capital, Chinese control of GMG International did not
immediately and radically change the socio-economic conditions in the Cameroonian subsidiary.
Nonetheless, interviews show that there have been recent improvements in the working conditions,
in particular through the adoption of the sanitation, safety and environment policy, the insurance
policies, and the improvement of medical services for the employees and their families. In addition,
the decision taken by the Chinese management in 2013 to transfer 3 per cent of the total 90 per cent
of shares to the employees’ association is remarkable, as such transfer had been promised but had
been resisted by the previous owner since 1998. In other words, and in contrast to past trends, the
new shareholders and management company seem determined to adopt and, most importantly,
implement an improved social strategy. Therefore, in this case, the CSR strategy of the Chinese
transnational company is attempting to improve the unacceptable situation of conﬂict and perceived
deprivation left by the Singaporean shareholders. While the new CSR strategy could be a case of
greenwashing to improve the social image of the enterprise, it could also be a new departure towards
improved sustainability in the company’s internal and external practices (Utting and Ives, 2006).
Although material improvements have indeed already been provided by the new management,
only time will tell whether all promises will be maintained. To their credit, and in contrast to past
owners, the current managers reportedly acknowledge the critical situation and want to put an end to
the social injustice and permanent poverty that characterises the lives of the local communities. Of
course this remains a challenging task, especially if short-term material improvements are not concur-
rently backed by a strategy addressing what the local population still perceive as an unfair land grab.
In this regard, we argue that the role of the State, more than the nationality of origin of
investment capital, is paramount for the improvement of the population’s well-being. In fact,
Hevecam is not the sole example of such problematic conditions within the Cameroonian agro-
industrial sector, as shown by other recent studies on multinational companies working in the
Cameroonian palm oil and banana industries, both with primarily French capital (Boulanger et al,
2009, pp. 27–28; MISEREOR, 2010). In fact, most of the agro-industrial enterprises in Cameroon
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seem to be associated with negative effects on the living conditions of local communities
(Willame, 1985; Gerber, 2011). As argued by Cerutti et al (2011) and Brautigam (2012), there is
not necessarily a discernable, generalisable difference in the behaviour of Chinese companies
compared with non-Chinese companies in socio-political situations characterised by weak
political and administrative institutions.
In this case, the company’s CSR seems to be a hybrid strategy instead of one single category
among the list presented by Auld et al (2008). Indeed, through their improvement measures, the
company has addressed some burning socio-environmental issues likely due to pressure from
employees and local communities, as well as native endeavours by the ﬁrm to address environmental
and social concerns by installing environmental management systems to conform with ISO 9001
certiﬁcation, and to develop other internal safety and environmental policies. Another complemen-
tary explanation of the change of CSR in the Cameroonian subsidiary can be connected to the fact
that, recently, Chinese State-owned enterprises started to apply CSR standards to their operations in
Africa (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2012). Thus, real improvements seem to occur when government
authority and civil society pressure are met with good will on the part of the company.
Even if it is premature to fully assess the new trend of the relations between the current
management team and neighbouring communities, there is evidence of improvements within the
plan currently being negotiated to plant rubber for villagers. This project may represent a step
towards more economic equity (Assembe-Mvondo, 2006). However, our interviews suggest that
the burning claim of ancestral land compensations is likely to be left unresolved by both State
authorities and the Chinese management team (Oyono, 2005; Gerber, 2008). This issue could be
a persistent bee in any owner’s bonnet until settled.
In summary, the case of the two-phased privatisation of Hevecam in Cameroon, through a deal
with the Singaporean ﬁrm GMG, followed by recapitalisation by the Chinese ﬁrm Sinochem,
challenges a number of prevailing assumptions. First, it challenges the notion upon which
privatisation was based, that is, that privatisation would bring new employment to the sector and
improve working conditions. In fact, under GMG (Singaporean) employment decreased and
general conditions remained more or less the same, while company employees failed to receive
the promised beneﬁts, including the transfer of 3 per cent of the company’s capital to them.
Second, it challenges the common perception in the Western media that investment from Asia,
and particularly from China, systematically results in less satisfactory corporate social practices
than investment by non-Asian companies (Moyo, 2011, 2012; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2012).
In fact, evidence from this case suggests that some of the problems associated with the initial
privatisation have been addressed by the new owner based in China. Finally, however, the
hypothesis that the origin of a company’s capital will affect the local uptake of the parent
company’s CSR code of conduct is to be treated with scepticism. In this case, Sinochem has
inherited a set of problems, including uncompensated dispossession of local communities’ lands
and unfulﬁlled promises to workers, that will require a great deal of effort and expense to rectify.
Only time will tell whether a new culture of CSR brought by the Chinese multinational will
reduce conﬂict, and improve local livelihoods and environmental outcomes.
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